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We explore the consequences of treating the multiple, non-market benefits associated with improvements
in ecosystem health and the market economy from which damage to these ecosystems stems as an
integrated system. We find that willingness to pay measures of use-based ecosystem services are impacted
by the changes in demand for complementary market goods. Demand for these goods shifts due to
the introduction of pollution regulations that deliver improvements in ecosystem services. As a result,
partial equilibrium estimates of these use values may be measured with substantial error if they fail
to account for the general equilibrium adjustments caused by the regulation. We also find that the basic
physical/biological connections between the resources underlying use and non-use values for ecosystems












In this paper, we report on the results of experiments designed to explore the consequences
of treating the multiple, non-market bene￿ts associated with improvements in ecosystem
health and the market economy from which damage to these ecosystems stems as an
integrated system.
Forty years ago Ayres and Kneese (1969) launched the transformation of the modern
economic perspective on environmental externalities. At that time, economists treated
externalities as exceptional cases that could be adequately addressed through ￿simple ad
hoc arrangements.￿ Today, there is a much greater appreciation of the pervasive nature of
some externalities. The debate about climate change and policies to control greenhouse
gases has helped to provide a tangible, widely recognized, example of the implications
of materials and energy balances for widespread externalities resulting from production
and consumption activities that Ayres and Kneese highlighted. Nevertheless, it would be
a mistake to conclude that economists fully appreciate the implications of the general
equilibrium perspective Ayres and Kneese advocated or the quantitative tools needed to
act on their insights.
Two years earlier, Krutilla’s (1967) call for a revision of the economic criteria used
to evaluate preservation versus development decisions broadened the scope for evaluating
environmental externalities in a di￿erent way. His paper challenged the conventional view
of how consumption should be represented in preferences. He identi￿ed a distinction
between consumption as ￿use￿ and services that contribute to utility but do not require
any type of use. His discussion was quite general and he argued that some people might
have preferences for protecting unique natural environments, species, or ecosystems simply
to assure they would ￿exist.￿ This led to considerable literature aimed at reconciling the
2practical and conceptual challenges implied by existence values with methods for measuring
the bene￿ts of improving environmental quality that continues to this day.
What is sometimes overlooked in these discussions is that the services involved need
not be limited to unique natural environments or ￿cute critters.￿ In the context of climate
change or biodiversity loss, the science suggests that the integrity of fundamental, back-
ground services delivered by large-scale physical and biological systems may be at stake.
Without raising the specter of disaster, changes to these systems could result in important
changes to the level of resources required to maintain market and non-market services at
a level consistent with current living standards. At the same time, the values that people
place on these background services are not easily captured using the standard techniques
employed by environmental economists to measure changes in environmental quality.
In particular, existence values need not have any observable demand signal in the market
economy to document the fact that people would be willing to sacri￿ce resources to
protect or enhance these services. As a result, we cannot rely solely on revealed preference
techniques for assessing these trade o￿s. Modeling how these services contribute to utility
in formal preference structures requires the use of separability restrictions to specify how
the trade o￿s between market goods and services (including the uses of environmental
resources) are a￿ected by non-use or existence consumption.
As an illustration of the issues that are at the center of our analysis, suppose an
individual derives utility U from a vector of marketed consumption goods, x, leisure, l,
and a vector of services derived from an ecosystem, q. If the individual has both use and
non-use values for the ecosystem then q enters the utility function in at least two places:
U = V (c(Q(q);x;l);h(q)) (1)
3q enters here in a subfunction c(Q(q);x;l) where services associated with the ecosystem
are combined with market goods and leisure time to create use-based values. q also enters
as a weakly separable element, h(q), which captures the non-use components of ecosystem
value.1
Two aspects of any analysis of the role of ecosystem services in economic activity
become clear when use and non-use values are viewed in this way. First, the value of some
ecosystems to the individual will, in general, depend on the prices of market goods and
the labor/leisure choice. When a pollution regulation is put in place, for example, the
increase in prices of pollution-intensive goods and the corresponding decrease in the real
compensation for labor implies a lower demand for these market goods and higher demand
for leisure. To the extent that non-market goods exhibit special relationships with these
goods or the overall cost of living is a￿ected in important ways by these price changes,
the value of non-market services will also be a￿ected.
Second, the two components of ecosystem value will be related to each other. While
changes to the level of non-use services, h(q), will have no impact on the observed pattern
of consumption, they will a￿ect the value of other market and non-market services. 2
When the two sets of services are derived from the same ecosystem, changes in their
levels are physically related to each other through the basic physical/biological functions
of the ecosystem. This last feature of ecosystem values parallels the logic set out by
1Hanemann (1988) ￿rst proposed a variation on this de￿nition. Originally, non-use value was de￿ned
by including an additively separable term to preferences, where U = V (c(Q;x;l)) + h(q) (with Q and q
unrelated). This format implies that a composite of market goods and non-market, use-related services
are perfect substitutes for the non-use contribution to well-being. Yet another alternative, implying that
there are average substitutes for non-use services would be the same as equation (1) but exclude the links
between Q and q. Our formulation in equation (1) maintains the essential idea in non-use value ￿ revealed
preference information alone will not provide all the information necessary to understand the importance of
changes in q for people’s well-being.
2The exception to this statement is the special case in which non-use value is a perfect substitute for all
other consumption.
4Ayres and Kneese in which the physics of materials and energy balances makes the assets
associated with the ultimate deposition of byproducts of production and consumption and
its relationship to the various capacities of the environment to assimilate residuals from
these activities so important to the performance of the joint economic/environmental
system.
In a general equilibrium, these relationships in￿uence how the non-market consequences
of production and consumption choices feed back to alter individuals’ demands (and sup-
plies) for all goods and services. To the extent that non-market goods a￿ect leisure
demand, for example, they may have in￿uence throughout the market economy through
changes to labor supply. To the extent that changes in pollution-intensive activities are
a￿ected by these changes, they may also feed back to determine the equilibrium level of
pollution and services delivered by the ecosystem.
In short, a general equilibrium framework is needed to evaluate the connections between
ecosystem services and related market activities. Moreover, it must jointly represent the
connections between the relevant parts of the market economy as well as re￿ecting the
role that ecosystem services play in contributing simultaneously to the use and non-use
components of preferences.3
In this paper, we propose to begin the process developing a new generation of general
equilibrium models that incorporate these insights. We illustrate our ideas with an appli-
cation to the impacts of acidic deposition on ecosystem services in the Adirondacks. The
purpose of the application is to demonstrate the challenges associated with calibrating
such a model to non-market valuation information and assessing the quantitative signi￿-
3Ayres and Kneese emphasized the ￿rst part of these relationships ￿ the physical linkages in production
and consumption to residuals and the physical properties of natural systems. They overlooked the potential
for these linkages to produce feedback e￿ects via consumer preferences. This is where Krutilla’s analysis
contributes to the overall structure of our argument.
5cance of representing the bene￿ts of environmental regulations as an integrated part of a
general equilibrium system.
The speci￿c example we use is acidic deposition from nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide.
Three ecosystem services are assumed to be a￿ected ￿ freshwater ￿sh populations, scenic
vistas and tree cover, and a composite impact that is intended to re￿ect existence service
stemming from concerns about the damages to the habitat for the other two, use-related,
environmental resources (i.e. the ￿sh and trees) as well as other related species without
direct uses from acidic deposition. Our characterization of the concentration/response
functions and measures of economic values for these services are loosely based on the
existing literature. As a result, our model is not intended to be a serious policy evaluation
of acidic deposition. Rather, our objective is to describe how multiple feedbacks can arise
from non-market services and in￿uence the demands and supplies of market goods.
We have another objective as well. The connections that ecologists describe linking the
functions of ecosystems to the services economists identify as important to people depend
on the spatial scale. The scale for their analysis often does not match the scales for most
economic analyses. This issue of scale relates to both geography (or the spatial scale)
and the de￿nitions for what are exogenous in￿uences and endogenous responses as we
discuss below. Both are important and in￿uence our ability to use the existing literature in
environmental economics to calibrate a general equilibrium model that includes ecosystem
services.
Section 2 develops the background for our research. It discusses how the early public
economics literature made assumptions that precluded the inclusion of important feedback
e￿ects from externalities. This perspective has dominated much of the literature on general
equilibrium evaluations of environmental policy. We close this background by describing
how the composite of Ayres and Kneese and Krutilla’s contributions identi￿ed the issues
6central to the importance of non-market feedbacks for general equilibrium policy evaluation.
Section 3 shows how existing market and non-market information can be used to calibrate a
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with multiple non-market resources. Section
4 describes our model and 5 discusses the results for a representative policy scenario ￿
reducing emissions of nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide by 43%. Our primary objectives are
to demonstrate how partial equilibrium welfare measures for non-market services might
be modi￿ed by a general equilibrium approach and to describe how virtual prices signal
the importance of strategic modeling assumptions for non-market feedbacks. Finally the
last section discusses the implications of our analysis for developing more complete CGE




At the time they were writing, Ayres and Kneese noted that externalities were an inevitable
consequence of consumption and production activities because the e￿ects of alternative
residuals management policies were largely ignored. They illustrated this point diagram-
matically (see Figure 1 in their paper) and analytically, noting in their framework that
there are three classes of physical exchange for which there exist no counterpart
economic transactions. These are: (1) private use for production inputs of
￿common property￿ resources, notably air, streams, lakes, and the ocean; (2)
private use of the assimilative capacity of the environment to ￿dispose of￿ or
dilute wastes and residuals, and (3) inadvertent or unwanted material inputs to
7productive processes ￿ diluents and pollutants. All these goods (or ￿bads￿) are
physically transferred at zero price...because there exists no social institutions
that permit the resources in question to be ￿owned￿ and exchanged in the
market (p. 291)
They suggest that the in￿uence of a market might be simulated using shadow or virtual
prices for the services and that the monetization of these services would provide a type
of virtual income. However, when they introduced them into the model they placed them
as arguments that give rise to incremental social costs on the supply side of the economy
(represented by their equation (7)). Ayres and Kneese are speci￿c in suggesting that
demands for private goods carry over unchanged. This speci￿cation implies the feedback
e￿ects of changes in the quality of the environment on the demands for private goods are
not re￿ected in consumers’ behavior.
Shortly afterwards, Diamond and Mirrlees (1973) also argued for restrictions on these
feedback e￿ects to avoid anomalous outcomes. The issue in their case arises because
aggregate demand in a market exhibiting an externality might change in what they con-
sidered to be counterintuitive ways with a move from an unregulated equilibrium to an
e￿cient allocation. The anomalous case is problematic because, as Diamond and Mir-
rlees suggested, it seems to imply an upward-sloping demand function. However, Cornes
(1980) clearly dispels this case, noting that their concerns were due to a failure to properly
decompose the responses leading to the e￿cient outcome. 4 He notes that:
4All of the literature describes this issue as arising from a consumption externality. One individual’s
consumption a￿ects others and those others a￿ect that person. This characterization is misleading. Pollution
from production arises because some agents consumed the production involved. The real issue here is non-
separability and what we have identi￿ed as feedback e￿ects, not the fact that one agent’s consumption adds
or detracts from the well-being of others. Pollution from production activities could be described in these
terms as well. Our point is simply that the labeling of these cases has distracted attention from the more
fundamental point exposed by the Buchanan-Kafoglis example.
8In the absence of real income or welfare e￿ects, aggregate demand may vary
positively with prices. This is because in addition to the conventional com-
pensated price responses, there are compensated responses once thought to
be perverse or anomalous, once the role of compensated quality responses is
isolated and clearly understood (p. 317, emphasis added)
The explanation lies in di￿erent patterns of complementarity and substitution between
a private consumption good and the external e￿ect among agents. These interactions
lead to adjustment in each agent’s Hicksian demands for the consumption good such that
aggregate demand changes in unanticipated ways. The basic insight is that the structure
of non-separabilities across agents can lead to unanticipated changes in the demands for
market goods and their corresponding non-market outcomes.
To illustrate this point, consider a simple adaptation to the Diamond-Mirrlees struc-
ture. We have added a second private consumption good. Each of the two individuals’
preferences are separable in the two private goods but not in the externality, and one
of each person’s private consumption choices has an own contribution to the externality
as well as a ￿pure￿ external e￿ect. Equations (2) and (3) state the amended Diamond-
Mirrlees preference functions ￿ u() for individual one and v() for individual two ￿ with
1 and 2 the numeraire goods, x1 = x11 + x12 and x2 = x21 + x22 the two private goods
(xij, i = good, j = individual), and  and  the external e￿ects arising from the individuals’
consumption. These relationships are de￿ned in (2) through (5).
u(x11;x21;1;) = A1(x11;) + A2(x21;) + 1 (2)
v(x12;x22;2;) = B1(x12;) + B2(x22;) + 2 (3)
 = (x11;x12) (4)
9 = (x21;x22) (5)
The characterization of the externality creates the appearance of a non-separability in
individual one’s choices even though his preferences are speci￿ed as separable. For example,
in the case of individual one, these e￿ects arise through the in￿uence of x21 on the second
individual (via ) which in turn ￿feeds back.￿ The link causes a separable consumption
choice (x21) by individual one to have an e￿ect on his consumption of x11. This link takes
place because x11 has an external a￿ect on individual two and that individual’s choices
(x12) in￿uence individual one’s trade o￿s. Thus, even though x11 and x21 are speci￿ed to
be separable consumption choices for individual one, feedbacks outside the market make
them non-separable.
Of course, as Sandmo (1980) noted in his commentary on Diamond and Mirrlees, the
signi￿cance of these relationships for policy is an empirical matter. 5 To evaluate them,
we must make decisions about how to represent economic activities in a model, how to
account for the natural systems receiving the residuals identi￿ed in Ayres and Kneese,
and how to link the physical responses of these systems to the services people want from
the environment. The latter e￿ectively de￿nes the points of contact between these two
systems.
2.2 General Equilibrium Analysis with One Non-Market Good
The task of introducing non-separable externalities into a CGE model is more challenging
than one might initially expect. Carbone and Smith (2008) describe the challenges in
calibrating a model with a single non-market good and we base our discussion here on
5While this literature seemed to recognize that the plausibility of separability restrictions in this context
was an empirical issue, the literature in public economics continues to focus on its power as an analytical
simpli￿cation rather than on its relevance for real problems. See Gauthier and Laroque (2010).
10that study. Three factors contribute. First, the conventional practice calibrating constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) or nested CES functions to describe preferences and pro-
duction functions becomes signi￿cantly more di￿cult, because the externalities take the
form of quasi-￿xed goods in the preference structures. 6 This result arises because the
arguments used to represent them must be treated as outside the control of individual
agents. Once this change is made, the CES formulation no longer leads to convenient
closed-form expressions for demand and supply.
Second, the available information to recover the parameters in￿uencing how these
services contribute to preferences (or production) is not what we encounter for private
goods and services. As Ayres and Kneese noted, there are no market exchanges in these
services. As a result, we do not have access to a price measuring the marginal willingness
to pay for the last unit consumed of ecosystem services.
The literature on non-market valuation of environmental services must make one of
two types of assumptions about preferences. With revealed preference strategies speci￿c
restrictions to preferences (i.e. weak complementarity) allow the information provided
by observing records for private actions, such as trips to recreation sites or purchases of
homes, to be used to measure trade-o￿s for the non-market services. Stated preference
methods also make assumptions about preferences along with the presumption that stated
choices authentically measure the actual choices an individual would make when faced with
the same situation.
Beyond this, the results from these types of applied studies, measuring the economic
values for environmental services, usually provide estimates of willingness to pay or Mar-
6We could also introduce them as non-separable e￿ects on production. The classic case of the laundry
and the polluting steel plant is one example. Here we focus on feedbacks due to linkages in preferences.
Analogous problems would arise in the case of production-side linkages. See Finno￿ and Tschirhart (2003)
for a ￿sheries example with production-side ecological feedback e￿ects.
11shallian consumer surplus for speci￿c, discrete, changes in the services involved, not an
estimate for the marginal willingness to pay or virtual price. In addition, these are usually
measures for local situations such as a speci￿c recreation site or housing market. Because
the environmental services are not traded on markets, we should expect the marginal will-
ingness to pay values to be quite di￿erent in di￿erent areas. Nonetheless, we need to
include measures of these virtual prices at a scale that is consistent with the scale of the
general equilibrium model. This issue is one aspect of the e￿ects of scale that we raised
earlier. We return to the challenges posed by the heterogeneity in virtual prices with a
general equilibrium model that uses a representative agent format at the close of the paper
in discussing the implications and next steps in this line of research.
Finally, non-separability implies that calibration must match both the social accounting
matrix (SAM) representing the ￿ows of private goods and services as ￿nal consumption,
intermediate goods and factor inputs in the baseline year, and the ￿ows of residuals arising
from consumption and production. This alignment needs to also include the transfer
functions linking residuals to the use and existence services as they are represented in
preferences.7 We develop a new method to calibrate these types of models which we
describe in more detail below.
Ultimately, the answer to the Sandmo question about the empirical importance of these
non-separabilities depends on the share of virtual income (i.e. private income plus the
endowed environmental services valued at virtual prices in the benchmark year) accounted
for by environmental services and the relationship between these services and private goods
in preferences. As a point of reference, Carbone and Smith (2008) estimated the share
7A parallel development would be required in a model that recognized how ecosystem services contribute
to production. A ski resort is a￿ected by snow, a beach resort by marine debris, water quality and congestion.
To the extent that we model the services of these resorts in ways that include quality then these e￿ects
would be in production.
12of virtual income associated with particulate-matter air pollution at 1.53% and found that
non-separability between an air quality good and leisure demand led models that failed
to incorporate these connections to either underestimate (in the case of complements) or
overestimate (substitutes) the excess burden associated with a new 5% tax (in the presence
of a pre-existing 40% tax on labor income) on either the energy or the transportation
services sector. The errors ranged from 20% to 50% of the true excess burden of the
taxes.
Carbone and Smith used elasticities of substitution between leisure and air quality that
were multiples of two and one half the elasticity of substitution between other consumption
goods in the preferences structure. We have no empirical basis for judging what elasticity
values would be reasonable or unreasonable in this context, and we are unlikely to ￿nd
answers in the existing literature. The revealed preference studies routinely assume, as
a maintained condition, a speci￿c substitution or complementarity restriction in order to
estimate the trade-o￿s an individual would make to increase a speci￿c non-market resource.
This is the link that allows the choices of private goods to reveal the marginal values for
changes in non-market goods that are assumed to be connected through preferences or
technology to them. Stated preference studies focus on discrete changes in a speci￿c
resource and reveal little about the responses to small changes (and the responses in private
goods associated with them) that are needed to estimate substitution relationships. Thus,
we are left with an assessment that in this simple case, with one non-market resource and
the relatively small share of income attributed to air quality, that the feedbacks could be
important with ￿large enough￿ linkages between the non-market services and the marketed
goods and services.
132.3 Krutilla and Feedbacks
Krutilla’s paper is usually credited with de￿ning existence or non-use values as relevant
components of the economic gains realized from protecting or enhancing environmental
services. By drawing a distinction between ￿on-site use￿ or use of environmental services
with another private good his paper focused attention on how those services should enter
preferences and whether the contributions observed through private goods’ demands fully
captured all of the reasons a person would be willing to trade o￿ resources to protect
a non-market resource as we noted. Hanemann’s (1988) characterization of non-use or
existence values is now widely accepted as the most general. He suggests the equivalent
of a nested structure of e￿ects (as described in equation (1)), with some in￿uences to
a consumer’s well-being that arise in combination with private goods and some without.
Thus, in his description of Krutilla’s concepts we would observe the e￿ects of non-market
services with private goods’ demands but these in￿uences need not re￿ect everything.
Thus, combining Krutilla’s arguments for re-specifying preferences with Ayres and
Kneese’s demonstration that a focus on general equilibrium was essential to the task
of understanding externalities yields our primary conclusions; a transformation to general
equilibrium analysis is required to fully acknowledge environmental feedbacks. Interactions
outside markets are important within the ambient environment but so also is the structure
in preferences (and production). This structure is what serves to de￿ne the full extent of
non-market environmental feedbacks. Thus, to appreciate their potential importance we
need multiple resources with di￿erent types of contributions to preferences (or production)
relationships. We turn to that task in our model after describing the transformations to
conventional CGE calibration to incorporate consistently these types of e￿ects.
143 Calibrating Multiple Non-Market Resources
Typically, a subset of the parameters required to specify a numerical general equilibrium
model are selected based on the literature and judgment, and the remainder are set to
match a benchmark equilibrium. 8 As noted earlier, with homogenous-of-degree-one func-
tions and market goods, this task is readily accomplished using Rutherford’s (2002) cali-











i=1 i = 1
where  di is the benchmark level of consumption of good i, and  = 1   1=, where 
is the Allen elasticity of substitution. Under these circumstances i corresponds to the
benchmark expenditure share for commodity i relative to the total for all K goods.9
Introducing non-market goods into this framework and treating them as quasi-￿xed
implies that preferences and production functions will no longer be homothetic and that
the simple interpretation of the allocation terms ( i) as expenditure shares no longer holds
(Perroni 1992, Carbone and Smith 2008). Carbone and Smith de￿ned new shares in terms
of virtual income using exogenously ￿set￿ virtual prices for air quality based on hedonic
property value estimates of marginal willingness to pay. Here we propose a more general
strategy. Let d designate a vector of goods that can be decomposed into two components,
dM and dq, for market (M) and quasi-￿xed (q) goods so U(d) =  U(dM;dq).
8For discussion of this process see Mansur and Whalley (1984) and Rutherford (2002).
9If the function is nested, the same result holds and the shares correspond to the fraction of expenditures
on goods (or factors) in a nest.
15To write the budget constraint in general terms, assume production can be represented
with an activity analysis framework, with A now describing a matrix with each element the
net output of commodity i per unit of sector j (i.e. output minus input); y a vector of
inputs available to each sector; E a matrix of initial endowments of the K goods to H
households and D a matrix of demands for the K goods by the H households, with l a
vector of ones.
When there is only one household, the general equilibrium conditions correspond to the
￿rst order conditions for a constrained optimization problem ￿ maximizing utility subject
to a budget constraint. The budget constraint is given in equation (7).
Ay   (Dl   El)  0 (7)
or
d  Ay + e
where d and e correspond to vectors of demands and initial endowments (i.e. d = Dl and
e = El for the multiple household case).


























We can separate these sets of constraints with the Lagrangian multipliers for the ￿rst
group continuing to serve as market prices. In this setting the objective is to frame the
problem so that it mimics Walras law (i.e. if z(p) is the representative consumer’s vector
of excess demands at price p, then the fact that income balances total expenditures
16implies pTz(p) = 0). Equilibrium excess demand will exhibit complementary slackness
with market prices. When we introduce non-market goods we need to augment income
and structure prices so that the same condition continues to be satis￿ed for market and
non-market goods. Dividing prices into market determined ( pM) and virtual (pq(pM;dq))
for calibration, using Rutherford’s calibrated-shares logic we simply set pq(pM;dq) to an
exogenously determined vector of constants, p0, and augment endowments so that the
designation of the share parameters in terms of virtual income reproduces the equilibrium.
This logic relies on estimates of the marginal willingness to pay at the benchmark values
of the vector d.
If we can develop a set of marginal willingness to pay estimates from the literature
(and treat them as constants), then these can be easily incorporated in the Rutherford
calibrated share framework as described above. If we observe the willingness to pay for
a discrete change in some dimension of environmental quality, as is often the case in
non-market valuation studies, then the calibration technique must derive the implied value
for p0. These values need to be consistent with market and non-market conditions in the
benchmark equilibrium and to yield the correct area under the inverse demand curve for the
non-market good. The logic associated with the process will, in principle, accommodate
any form of non-market valuation information. 10 For example, structures commonly used
in travel cost demand or averting behavior models could be accommodated. One needs
only to de￿ne the relationship between the results available from the revealed preference
model and the parameters of the CGE preference speci￿cation. 11
10For example, the early example developed by Espinosa and Smith (1995) did not recognize the feasibility
of building in calibrating constraints into the optimization problem that de￿nes the benchmark. Instead they
assume air quality had a perfect substitute as an a￿ne transformation of consumer services. Their strategy
allowed calibration to a benchmark without the explicit de￿nition of the willingness to pay expressions in
terms of preferences. Perfect substitution in their case implies a simple function of expenditures on that
private good should equal the benchmark willingness to pay.
11The logic parallels the arguments developed in Smith, Pattanayak and Van Houtven (2002) for using
174 A Stylized Model with Multiple Non-Market Goods
Our model is deliberately simple, allowing the two key elements in￿uencing the nature and
importance of the feedbacks between the non-market services and the demands for private
market goods to be easily identi￿ed. These two features are: (a) the speci￿c ways in
which non-market services enter preference functions as non-separable in￿uences on the
trade-o￿s that agents would be prepared to make among marketed goods and services; and
(b) the transformations that de￿ne the relationship between physical/biological responses
of the model ecosystem in our application and the recognizable changes in the ￿services￿
that agents attribute to these activities or resources.
Our example uses an illustrative model of the U.S. economy proposed by Goulder and
Williams (2003) in the context of evaluating the deadweight loss of energy taxes. It has
￿ve ￿nal consumption goods as well as leisure, four intermediate goods, and one input
(labor). The model was designed to illustrate the performance of alternative measures of
excess burden losses arising from adding di￿erent new taxes in a system with a pre-existing
preference calibration to develop consistent, partial equilibrium bene￿t transfers. In another context it is the
logic Bullock and Minot (2006) used to demonstrate weak complementarity could be used to numerically
derive Hicksian welfare measures without requiring the Willig (1978) condition. However,one aspect of these
parallels deserves further discussion. Non-market valuation estimates for the willingness to pay (WTP) for
discrete increments in a non-market service are partial equilibrium measures that take prices and income as
given. The benchmark for estimates of the WTP need not correspond to the prices and income for the
market conditions represented by a given CGE model. As a result, adjustment to match those conditions
is likely to be required. In most policy contexts this has been somewhat ad hoc, with adjustments using
the consumer price indexes and/or arbitrary scaling based on real income growth. Ideally one would start
the process by constructing a SAM for the benchmark associated with the timing (and the location) of
the WTP estimate and then use that to estimate a starting point for the new calibration. The strategy
used will depend on the assumptions made by the analyst about the interpretation of the representative
agent’s preferences ￿ e.g. as a local approximation. This issue was discussed in formal terms for the partial
equilibrium case by Smith et al. (2002). It was also raised indirectly in Eiswerth and Shaw (1997). Our point
is not that individuals recognize the general equilibrium implications of a change in a non-market good but
that consistency implies WTP estimates be treated as derived from what has been described as a variation
function (McConnell 1990). As a result, they will be functions of the prices and income associated with
the individuals used to estimate them. Because these values need not correspond to the benchmark for the
market data in an applied problem, consistency requires a consistent reference point for calibration.
18tax on labor income. We add to it the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(1996) estimates for emission rates in 1995 (the year of the market data used to calibrate
the model) for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides for each sector. Our objective is to
link these emissions to acidic deposition rates and, in turn, to three interdependent ways
acidic deposition is assumed to in￿uence households. Details on the numerical model are
presented in the appendices at the end of the paper.
Figure 1 provides a schematic description of the preferences we assume for the rep-
resentative agent. Our primary channel through which reduced acid rain contributes to
individual well-being is through its e￿ect on outdoor recreational activities. We selected
two types of recreational e￿ects that have been documented in the literature (see Rowe,
Lang, Chestnut, Latimer, Rae, Bernow and White (1995)). The ￿rst of these impacts
arises in recreational ￿shing through the e￿ect of acidity on ￿sh stocks in the lakes in the
Northeast. We use the experience in the Adirondacks to provide a tangible example of the
impacts. The second interaction with recreational activities arises through the e￿ects of
acidic deposition on the quality and diversity of tree cover. These changes are assumed to
in￿uence the trade-o￿s people would make to undertake recreation that involves hiking to
enjoy scenic vistas as part of their recreational experiences. We expect that both of these
e￿ects would be closely linked to consumption of market-based consumer services as well
as to the allocation of leisure time. These linkages are re￿ected in the nesting structure
of the representative agent’s preferences in ￿gure 1.
The other mechanism for an e￿ect due to acidic deposition arises through what we
described as the existence/habitat composite. These services make a weakly separable
contribution to well being at the top level of the nesting structure. While our speci￿cation
is somewhat arbitrary, the interconnection is consistent with the logical development we
19described with non-market services making non-separable contributions to preferences. 12
It also is consistent with the general logic used to describe what might be treated as the
￿bundled￿ services of an ecosystem with the background descriptions given in contingent
valuation scenarios (see Banzhaf, Burtraw, Evans and Krupnick (2006) as an example). 13
Speci￿c types of use are not identi￿ed.
4.1 Measures of Values for Non-Market Services
Our speci￿cation of the links between sulfur and nitrogen emissions and the non-market
services relies on simple algebraic relationships. For forest views we use the model in the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (1999) Prospective Analysis describing
how emissions a￿ect deciviews of visibility to compute a unit value in 1995 dollars for
emissions reduction in kg/hectare. The e￿ects of acidic deposition on ￿sh populations
are based on a survey of 1,469 lakes during 1984 to 1987 reported in Driscoll, Lawrence,
Bulger, Butler, Cronan, Eagar, Lambert, Likens, Stoddard and Weathers (2001). We
obtained these data from the online database cited by the authors. For the records with
complete data, we estimated a simple regression model relating the number of ￿sh species
in each lake relative to the maximum number of ￿sh species in any of the lakes to a
quadratic in the measured Ph level in each lake as well as controls for the size of the lake
and the size of the watershed associated with each lake. The estimated equation is given
12See Smith (2004) for a discussion of this formulation in comparison to others that have been used in
decomposing use and non-use values.
13Banzhaf et al. (2006) describe a scenario in which a long term (10 year) program is proposed to
reduce the e￿ects of acidi￿cation for a speci￿c set of ecosystem services. In the Banzhaf application the
scenario describes the Adirondack Park as having a total of 3,000 lakes. 1,500 of these lakes are described
as experiencing injuries due to acidic deposition. These ￿lakes of concern￿ have ￿sh populations that are
impacted. Forests and bird populations are experiencing some injuries. In the base case 90% of forests are
described as ￿healthy￿ and 80% of bird populations at their historic level. The plan decreases the lakes of
concern by 600 to 900 and makes small improvements in the population of the bird species and one tree
species in the areas with the improved lakes. We treat this as a composite improvement, measured with a
CES aggregate function, bundling the lakes (￿sh), birds, and trees into one arbitrary unit.
20below.
ln(# ￿sh species / max # ￿sh species) =




Setting the surface area and watershed area at the mean values we derived a quadratic
relationship between the relative number of species supported by a lake and acidic levels,
as displayed in ￿gure 2. It is important to acknowledge that this is a stylized description
intended to illustrate the importance of baseline conditions for the response to e￿orts to
control emission.
The last component of our analysis is the composite or habitat services that are included
to represent e￿ects of non-use services. Here we use the number of lakes improved in
the Banzhaf et al. (2006) contingent valuation study of the bene￿ts of reducing acidic
deposition in the Adirondacks. Using the Kopp and Smith (1997) proposed CES index we
derive the marginal willingness to pay for the habitat / non-use services, calibrated so the
elasticity of substitution in the Kopp-Smith function is consistent with the estimates for
the willingness to pay to improve 600 lakes. The scenario identi￿es a total of 3,000 lakes
in the Adirondacks Park. 1,500 of these are described as being of concern due to acidic
deposition. Thus, the improvement is for 600 of the 1500 lakes that are a￿ected by the
air pollution leading to acidic deposition (see Banzhaf et al. (2006)).
Table 1 summarizes the assumptions and data sources used for each non-market com-
ponent of the model.14 Linking the damages (per household) to a national model of the
14The market components are taken from Goulder and Williams (2003), which is a model of the entire
U.S. Hence, the input intensities in the model will re￿ect this assumption and to the extent that the local
economy of the Adirondack region di￿ers from national averages, this assumption will introduce inaccuracies.
21U.S. economy (in 1995) we assume the problem is national in scope ￿ at the level of
importance represented by the measures available for the Adirondacks. All estimates for
deposition and willingness to pay measures are transformed to 1995 dollars.
4.2 Design of Policy Scenarios
The policy scenarios are designed to examine the general equilibrium consequences of
introducing a set of least-cost output taxes to achieve a 43% reduction in both SO2 and
NOx emissions, a reduction roughly consistent with estimates of the e￿ect of the Clean
Air Act amendments of 1990 over the period 1990-2010. The implied vector of tax rates
for the sectors of the numerical model is: Primary Energy = 9.4%, Manufacturing = 0.4%,
Transportation = 55.5%, Utilities = 42.5%.
These tax rates are derived in two steps. First, the model is calibrated to describe the
1995 level of market activity, pollution conditions (i.e. deposition rates), and non-market
preferences for ecosystem services, based on estimates for the willingness to pay for reduc-
tions in pollution that re￿ect all three ecosystem contributions to individual well-being (i.e.
recreational ￿shing, scenic vistas and recreational hiking, and composite species/habitat
service). With preference parameters set at this level we consider the equilibrium prices
for SO2 and NOx permits that would yield at least a 43% reduction in emissions. The
equivalent sectoral tax rates are what we label here as the least-cost output taxes. Be-
cause emissions are assumed to be a ￿xed fraction of output in each polluting sector of
the economy, these taxes simply re￿ect the pollution intensity of these sectors implied by
the calibration of the model. The equilibrium prices and quantities that result from the
introduction of the output taxes (or, equivalently, pollution permits de￿ned in units con-
In principle, a SAM could be developed for the states contributing to the acidic deposition problem in
Adirondack.
22sistent with output) are calculated under the assumption that tax revenues are transferred
in lump sum to consumers. Because the model involves feedback mechanisms, the tax
rates to achieve the 43% reduction will depend on the preference speci￿cation linking the
non-market services to the market goods. We calibrated taxes for the ￿central￿ case de-
scribed below. The actual reduction in emissions will not be exactly 43% as the preference
speci￿cation changes due to the e￿ects of these changes on the both the extent and the
impacts of feedbacks.
Implementing this policy of new taxes designed to reduce emissions results in changes
in market prices, changes in the levels of ￿sh, tree cover and scenic vistas, as well as to the
composite species/habitat service. There are also changes in the virtual prices associated
with these non-market services.
We have selected two aspects of our computations of the di￿erent general equilibrium
solutions to illustrate the potential for feedback e￿ects. The ￿rst considers how the degree
of complementarity between the two use-based non-market services, market-based con-
sumer services and leisure in￿uence the bene￿ts we attribute to the same policy changes.
Three alternatives are evaluated: a ￿central￿ case with a baseline calibration of the elastic-
ities in the model, a ￿high￿ complementarity case in which the degree of complementarity
between the use-based services and their complementary market goods is twice as strong
as in the central case, and a ￿low￿ complementarity case where this complementarity is
half as strong as in the central case.
For each of the general equilibrium bene￿t computations, the actual general equilib-
rium response to policy is held constant. What is varied is the de￿nition of the bene￿t
measure used to re￿ect how important general equilibrium e￿ects are. To accomplish this
objective, we vary how the market and non-market environment are related the bene￿ts
of a change in the level of one individual amenity. The way the levels of market prices and
23other environmental amenities in￿uence our bene￿t measures illustrates the importance of
treating the valuation problem in a general equilibrium framework.
To de￿ne the experiment more precisely, let e(p;q;u) designate the Hicksian expen-
diture function with p the vector of market prices, q the vector of quasi-￿xed (from the
individual’s perspective) non-market services, and u the level of well-being. Equations (10)
through (13) de￿ne the alternative measures. The total willingness to pay for a discrete
change in one non-market service is simply the change in the expenditure level required to
maintain utility level u0. We adopt the notation splitting out qi and qj6=i to distinguish our
focus on the change in one non-market service versus the simultaneous changes in other
subsets of non-market services that actually take place in a general equilibrium response
to the tax policy.
At one end of the spectrum, the change in qi could be measured before the other
arguments in the expenditure function change (equation (10)). At the other end of the
spectrum, all other changes could be assumed to have taken place at the outset (equation
(13)). Our strategy for understanding how the general equilibrium e￿ects change the value
of the improvement in one non-market service is to compute a range of such measures as
a decomposing the in￿uence of the di￿erent e￿ects of the general equilibrium change on
the value of such an improvement. Speci￿cally, we compare:
















































One might argue that the value of simultaneous changes in the levels of multiple
amenities could be measured using a summation of standard, partial equilibrium values. Our
analysis demonstrates that even the WTP measures for individual amenities are interrelated
in a way that makes them non-separable from other non-market changes and market
changes. Therefore, these measurements must be made jointly using a general equilibrium
approach like the one described in this paper.
The comparisons developed in equations (10-13) parallel the distinctions between con-
sumer surplus for a price change measured along a partial versus a general equilibrium
demand function (see Just, Hueth and Schmitz (2004), pp. 327-330). The general equi-
librium demand function for a particular good measures the consumer surplus due to an
intervention ￿ say a new commodity tax on that good ￿ by evaluating that good’s de-
mand at the general equilibrium prices for all goods (i.e. re￿ecting the general equilibrium
e￿ects of the new tax in these markets). In our case, we consider separately the evaluation
of a change in a single qi evaluated at general equilibrium values for all other q’s, all gen-
eral equilibrium prices for marketed goods or at general equilibrium values for both. The
distinctions highlight the importance of the interconnections associated with feedbacks.
There is a separate issue that also relates to feedback e￿ects between the non-market
25components of a general equilibrium model and the markets. The easiest way to describe it
is to recognize that in a general equilibrium setting a policy causes many changes simulat-
neously. Thus, while our least-cost output taxes might have been intended to improve the
abundance of ￿sh by reducing acidic deposition, reductions in emissions also a￿ect the tree
cover and the services we described as being associated with non-use or existence motives.
In addition, the relative prices of the goods and services change. All of these e￿ects are
associated with the policy. This description of the general equilibrium consequences has
been the traditional focus describing the di￿erence between partial equilibrium and general
equilibrium measures of the willingness to pay for a policy, considering all of its e￿ects.
Such a general equilibrium measure would be de￿ned by equation (14).







In this context, e￿orts to distinguish primary versus ancillary bene￿ts of the policy would
separate the e￿ects of the changes in qi versus the changes in the other q’s in di￿erent
ways.
Our focus here is on how the treatment of the feedback e￿ects in￿uences the willingness
to pay for a change in a single service. To illustrate this in a general equilibrium setting, we
must de￿ne the way it would be accomplished in order to generate the general equilibrium
e￿ects. Our model abstracts from pollution abatement procedures and simpli￿es the
transmission mechanism from emissions to e￿ects. As a result, there are no options to
adjust control responses and the policy is exceptionally costly. It would never ￿pass￿ a
bene￿t-cost review. That is not our point. 15 Rather, our objective is to highlight how
15The conventional general equilibrium willingness to pay for the taxes as a policy that changes both
the vector of non-market services and the relative prices of market goods is negative, as expected. The
speci￿cation of the degree of complementarity in the case also has an e￿ect on the size of the loss. This
impact is small. The larger story is the one we have highlighted that parallels the distinction between partial
26preference linkages change the impact of the general equilibrium point of evaluation for
the willingness to pay measures used to evaluate a single change in an environmental
service.
We illustrate this by performing a sensitivity analysis with respect to all of the elas-
ticities that control the relationships between the market and non-market goods ￿ both
for the use values and for the composite/habitat existence value included in the model.
As we noted earlier, we do not know the nature of the substitution or complementary
relationships between the non-market services and market goods. Revealed preference es-
timation methods treat this as a maintained assumption. Our calibration strategy assumes
some degree of complementarity between the use-based non-market goods, leisure and key
complementary market services. For existence value, however, any degree of substitution
with the other components of preferences is potentially consistent with the idea of non-use
value as long as the good is weakly separable.
In this part of the analysis, we focus on the virtual prices of the non-market goods as a
way to evaluate the important relationships to look for. Large changes in virtual prices for
the same set of taxes with changes in the preference structure signal important impacts
on the relationships between non-market and market goods.
equilibrium and general equilibrium demand functions (and supply when there is not constant returns to
scale).
Degree of WTPTotal GE % di￿erence




NOTES: WTP measured in 100-millions of 1995 dollars.
274.3 Scenario Calibration
Two basic types of information are required for calibration of a conventional CGE model
￿ expenditure levels for the benchmark equilibrium of the economy and prior information
on the ￿rst-order responsiveness of the model, typically in the form of price or substitution
elasticities. With these data and assumptions about the representative agent’s preference
function and all production technologies, the calibrated-shares logic calibrates the free
parameters to replicate equilibrium output levels at the benchmark prices.
The inclusion of non-market commodities into this framework requires an extension of
this logic ￿ assigning (or computing based on the available non-market valuation mea-
sures) virtual prices consistent with the benchmark levels of SO2 and NOx. The description
underlying these virtual prices must be consistent with a description of the non-market ser-
vices a￿ected by the pollutants. It must also incorporate the connections between these
services and the non-market activities people undertake. Thus, the de￿nitions of the role
of non-market services in preference function, as well as the role assumed for pollution in
constructing the services that enter these virtual prices, contribute to the nature of the
interactions between choices and responses outside markets that a￿ect non-market ser-
vices. If there is information on the marginal willingness to pay for the non-market services
a￿ected by pollution (and we are prepared to assume that these values are relevant to
the levels of services implied by the benchmark equilibrium), then these estimates can be
used to construct the virtual prices for the benchmark solution. If one has estimates of
willingness to pay for discrete changes in non-market services, then one must calibrate to
the benchmark virtual price that implies the correct total willingness to pay. This is the
situation we illustrate with the current model.
We calibrate to match Hicksian and Marshallian labor supply elasticities because the
28leisure-labor choice is likely to be one important determinant of the feedback e￿ects in
the model. This task is complicated by the fact that the use-based non-market services
are non-separable arguments in the agent’s preference function, hence the labor supply re-
sponse depends on the non-market services level changes implied by a change in the market
wage. Because the emissions that determine those service levels are generated through-
out the economy, closed-form solutions for these elasticity responses are not available.
Numerical techniques are required to solve the implied system of nonlinear equations ￿
one equation for each elasticity value to be matched in the calibration of the model. This
process along with solution for the virtual prices of the non-market services associated with
the pollutants will be jointly determined. Thus, our numerical calibration strategy requires
the simultaneous solution of:16
 Zero-pro￿t, market-clearance and budget balance conditions to de￿ne the general
equilibrium response of non-market service levels to a wage change and the resulting
labor supply change.
 Conditions which de￿ne the parameters used to control the elasticity relationships
we wish to calibrate.
 Conditions which de￿ne the willingness-to-pay relationship which determine the bench-
mark virtual prices for non-market goods.
 Conditions which de￿ne the parameters used to ensure that the benchmark equilib-
rium in the model replicates output and price levels in the calibration data.
The algebraic form of the nested CES preference speci￿cation corresponding to ￿gure
1 for the representative agent is given in equation (15).
16The GAMS computer code responsible for performing the model calibration and computing the coun-















































where the ￿￿ terms are de￿ned as value shares of benchmark expenditures in the parenthe-
sized bundles of commodities that they modify. 17 This expression is given in Rutherford’s
calibrated share form as described earlier. The exponent parameters ( ;;;%; ) de￿ne
the elasticities of substitution between the various nests within the function.
 and the value share of leisure, rl, are chosen to match the speci￿c Hicksian and Mar-
shallian labor supply elasticity estimates supplied as prior information (0.25 and 0.05 re-
spectively). h, r
f and r
t are the value share parameters for the composite species/habitat,
the ￿shing, and the scenic vista services, respectively. They are chosen to match our data
on the willingness to pay for changes in the levels of these non-market services in the
Adirondack study area (see table 1).
,  and % are the parameters that determine the substitution relationships between
leisure demand (l), non-market services (f;t;h), and consumer services (CCSV 0). In the
policy scenarios, we vary the values these parameters take on relative to the calibrated
value of  in order to achieve speci￿c patterns of substitution between the market and
non-market components of the preferences structure. This exercise is the strategy we use
to vary the substitution and complementarity between market and non-market goods that
determine the relative strength and character of the feedback e￿ects in the economy.
17The top level terms (h and (1   h)) de￿ne shares of the total expenditures our of virtual income
(market income plus the benchmark value of the non-market services and leisure, whereas the super-scripted
instances within the various nests of the function are de￿ned relative to the total expenditures within the
nest.
30We choose ,  and % take on values that give the associated Allen elasticity parameters
(h;rl;r) speci￿c relationships to the value of u, the substitution elasticity that controls
the labor supply elasticity.  = 1 1=h;  = 1 1=rl; % = 1 1=r. In our central case,
h = u and rl = r = u=4. The e￿ect of this speci￿cation is to assure that the cross-
elasticities between the arguments within the nests governed by these parameters are one-
fourth as substitutable with each other as any one of them is with the commodities in the
bundle of consumption goods described in the bottom line of equation (15). The rationale
for this calibration is that the use-based non-market services (￿sh and tree values) should
exhibit strong relative complementarity with leisure time and the market-based consumer
services that are required to enjoy visits to the Adirondacks. 18 A typical value for u implied
by matching the labor supply elasticities that we calibrate to is around 2. 19 This makes the
value for h = 2 and rl = r = 0:5. In the low complementarity case, rl = r = 1 and
in the high complementarity case rl = r = 0:25. In the sensitivity analysis, we look at
all combinations of h, rl and r that are equal to the values they take on in the central
as well as twice and half these values.
To assure compatibility each variation in the model corresponds to a new calibration
to benchmark conditions ￿ altering the restrictions imposed as part of calibration in the
substitution elasticities. Thus each calibrated version of the model reproduces the same
willingness to pay measures for the non-market services and the same e￿cient output tax
rates. The slopes of the virtual price function for each non-market service are di￿erent.
Figure 3 illustrates the point for one non-market service. A and B can be interpreted as
18We de￿ne commodities as complements based on the cross-price elasticities that would be implied by
these substitution elasticities using the virtual prices. Smaller values for the  terms imply smaller cross-price
elasticities.
19The exact value of u that matches our labor supply estimates will depend on the values of the other
elasticity parameters in our preference structure. The range of values over all of calibrations we consider in
the sensitivity analysis are between 1.75 and 2.7.
31re￿ecting two alternative restrictions linking the substitution elasticities that might involve
this non-market service. Changes in the elasticity together with the restriction to reproduce
our benchmark values for willingness to pay and the implied restrictions linking the non-
market services to market goods must alter the slopes and positions of the willingness to
pay functions. Calibration assures that the total willingness to pay function for a ￿xed
change in that non-market service will be reproduced under benchmark conditions. The
functions are assumed in this case to be set to reproduce the WTP for the change from
A0 to A1. Thus the triangle represented by K must be equal to L so the areas under the
two curves will be the same.
5 Results
Table 2 describes the e￿ects of our policy scenario, a 43% reduction in SO2 and NOx
pollution, on the prices and quantities represented in the model. The di￿erent market and
non-market activities represented in the model are described on the rows of the table. The
three horizontal sections of the table, labeled High, Central and Low describe results under
the di￿erence assumptions about the degree of complementarity between the use-based
non-market services in the model and leisure and market-based consumer services. For
each of these scenarios, we report the percentage change in the price (or virtual price) of
the activity and the percentage change in the quantity supplied from benchmark levels.
Naturally, the largest e￿ects of the pollution taxes are on market prices are in those
sectors that are most pollution intensive in the benchmark data ￿ transportation, utilities
and primary energy production. All of these sectors experience large increases in cost
and corresponding reductions in quantities produced and consumed after the taxes are
implemented. Prices in other market sectors are relatively una￿ected.
32The virtual prices of the three non-market services go down signi￿cantly ￿ between
18 and 75 percent depending on the service and the complementarity scenario we are
considering. The marginal willingness to pay for these services goes down as the amounts
provided by the ecosystem go up under the policy scenario. The extent of the reduction
of the virtual prices depends on the degree of complementarity between the market and
non-market goods in the preference structure. As the use-based services (￿sh and tree)
become less complementary to leisure and consumer services, their values are less a￿ected
by the policy change. We can see by comparing the price changes for these goods in the
High, Central and Low complementarity scenarios described in the table.
Demand for consumer services and leisure both increase between 9 and 15 percent as a
result of the pollution taxes. This is due to the fact that these activities are not pollution
intensive and therefore become cheaper relative to market activities like transportation and
energy. It is also due to the fact that the complementarity with the use-based non-market
services increases demand for these goods as the ecosystem improves under the new policy.
Notice that even the virtual price of the good we associate with the existence of non-use
services is a￿ected by the policy change and varies across the complementarity scenarios.
While the e￿ect is not as strong as for the use-based values, the table illustrates how the
services attributed to existence values cannot be regarded as una￿ected by changes to the
other parts of the economy because they enter in a weakly separable form in preferences.
Connections throughout the natural system as well as market-based feedbacks in other
goods and services contribute to these changes.
To consider in more speci￿c terms the connections between the di￿erent market and
non-market goods interact, we now evaluate how the measures of total willingness to pay
for the improvement in one individual non-market service (the ￿sh service) delivered by
the policy is a￿ected by the other changes to the general equilibrium system. This is the
33qi in our de￿nitions of WTP in section 4.2. Table 3 reports on this topic. The di￿erent
welfare measures described in section 4.2 are listed in the rows of the table. The column
labeled ￿Before￿ describes the WTP calculation that an analyst would make if the other
changes to the general equilibrium system were ignored in setting the baseline point for
evaluating the change in qi. The column labeled ￿After￿ describes the WTP calculation
that incorporates some or all of the general equilibrium changes in setting the baselines for
evaluation. The column labeled % Di￿ is the percentage di￿erence between the Before
and After column values. The WTP measures are in 100-millions of 1995 US dollars. The
three vertical sections of the table, labeled ￿High￿, ￿Central￿ and ￿Low￿ describe results
under the di￿erence assumptions about the degree of complementarity between the use-
based non-market services and leisure and market-based consumer services, as in Table
2.
The improvement in the use-based ￿sh services implied by the policy change are valued
at between 560 and 890 million dollars depending on the complementarity scenario and
the speci￿c welfare measure used to evaluate the policy. With the exception of one case,
the value of the ￿sh services improvement is more valuable when some or all of the other
general equilibrium adjustments are taken into account. The e￿ect of introducing the other
improvements in the ecosystem values (tree and existence services) in the calculation does
not appear to have a large e￿ect on the value of the improvement in the ￿sh services.
This is indicated in the table by the di￿erence the values in the Before and After columns
for the WTP q measure. In the High complementarity scenario, where this e￿ect is most
strongly felt, it only results in a 2.7% di￿erence in the willingness to pay for ￿sh services.
Introducing the price changes in the market economy induced by the policy intervention
to the baseline used of evaluating the change in ￿sh services (indicated in the WTP p row
of the table) has substantially larger e￿ects however. In the Central case, failing take these
34in￿uences into account would underestimate the value of the improvement in ￿sh services
by approximately 25%. In the High complementarity case, this error more than doubles
(53%) and in the Low complementarity case it is approximately one half (12.5%). These
changes are similar in magnitude to the changes in the values of the elasticity parameters
in the nest of use-based services that we have assumed across these scenarios.
There is a strong intuition for these results. The higher the degree of complementarity
between use-based services and leisure and the consumer services good, the more depen-
dent is the value of an improvement in ￿sh or tree services on matching increases in these
market goods. As we noted earlier, a major e￿ect of the policy intervention is to cause con-
sumers to substitute our of pollution-intensive consumption and into activities like leisure
and services. Thus, the price changes due to the policy add value to the increases in the
ecosystem services by encouraging demand for complementary market goods.
The results described in table 4 explore the consequences of the di￿erent possible forms
that non-separability of the non-market services might take in the preference structure for
the equilibrium outcomes and the values placed by the consumer on these di￿erent ser-
vices. The ￿rst three columns of the table indicate the value that each of the substitution
elasticity parameters takes on in each scenario relative to the value assumed in the central
cases. Recall that h controls the degree to which the existence/habitat services is substi-
tutable with other all other forms of consumption. rl controls the substitution between
leisure and the bundle of use-based ecosystem services and the consumer services good,
and r controls the substitution within that bundle. The three horizontal sections of the
table, labeled Fish, Tree and Existence/Habitat refer to the three non-market services in
the model. For each non-market service, we report the percentage change in the virtual
price and quantity supplied from benchmark levels that is implied by the policy intervention.
Two conclusions emerge from the analysis of these alternative model speci￿cations.
35First, the equilibrium quantities of the di￿erent ecosystem services are less a￿ected by
the changes to the preference structure than the equilibrium virtual prices of the services.
Nevertheless, the quantities do vary across the scenarios described here by as much as ten
percentage points. This is a re￿ection of the feedback e￿ects between the non-market
goods and the market e￿ects of the tax policy. Most of the ￿action￿, however, is the
changes in the virtual prices. The elasticities that control the use-based nest in preferences
(r and rl) have natural e￿ects on the magnitude of the virtual price decreases for the
use-based services. For example, the percentage drop in the virtual price on ￿sh services
changes is upwards of 80% when r is half of the value it takes on in the central case and
around 30% when it is twice the central value. This is, again, due to the fact that the
value is more closely aligned to the use of consumer services when this elasticity value is
small.
However, there are also more indirect e￿ects. h (the existence value elasticity) a￿ects
the virtual prices of the other services by more than ten percentage points over the range
of values we consider. Thus, even in a model were the non-market services represent a
somewhat small share of virtual income (the existence value and the tree value represents
approximately 0.4% of virtual income each and the ￿sh value is approximately 0.03%
in our calibration), the presence of multiple services linked through the ecosystem and
through their relationships to market goods can have a marked e￿ect on the value of
any one improvement in an ecosystem service. These e￿ects simply re￿ect the pattern
of equilibrium adjustments across the economy due to non-market and market feedback
e￿ects.
366 Implications
The early papers by Ayres and Kneese (1969) and Krutilla (1967) provided the conceptual
basis for re-considering how economic assessments of environmental policy are undertaken.
Ayres and Kneese argued that environmental externalities were not ￿exceptional and minor￿
but pervasive. Partial equilibrium strategies would be incomplete because they failed to
account for the linkages between sectors through the non-market consequences of residuals
management. Their focus was primarily on the supply side of general equilibrium models.
Krutilla’s arguments can be used to suggest that the services attributed to modi￿cations
in the natural landscape, including the decisions about how to dispose of the residuals
prominent in the Ayres and Kneese framework, entered preferences in several distinct
ways. In his framework, these di￿erent contributions were associated with use and non-
use motives for protecting ecosystems. The subsequent literature on non-market valuation
has focused primarily on the challenges in measuring the use and non-use trade-o￿s. There
is another challenge that follows from his framework. It arises once we recognize that, in a
general equilibrium setting, non-market feedbacks change when we acknowledge existence
values as a component of preferences.
The implications of these early papers have not been fully appreciated. Modern treat-
ments of applied welfare economics (see Just et al. (2004) for example) focus attention
on the market interactions that distinguish partial equilibrium and general equilibrium mea-
sures of consumer surplus (and deadweight loss). They fail to recognize the important
feedbacks from the non-market consequences of policy. Sometimes policy is intended to
improve some aspect of environmental quality. In other situations the objective is some-
thing else such as improving transportation or energy infrastructure and there are indirect
e￿ects on environmental services. In both cases there are feedbacks that can in￿uence the
37prices and quantities of market related goods and services in a general equilibrium. Ayres
and Kneese conjectured correctly in our view that ￿...the partial equilibrium approach is
probably not convergent to the general equilibrium solution...￿ (p. 296).
We have demonstrated in a simple case with multiple environmental services that they
were correct. Even in a situation where the share of virtual income (i.e. the economic
value of market and non-market services assessed at equilibrium prices and virtual prices)
is small the errors from ignoring them can be large. We have also illustrated the sensitivity
of these feedbacks to the structure of the substitution or complementarity relationships
between market goods and non-market services.
Unfortunately we know little about the nature of these linkages. E￿orts to measure
the trade-o￿s people would make to increase non-market services (or to enhance their
quality) have routinely assumed a preference linkage such as weak complementarity or
perfect substitution to derive estimates (see Ebert (1998) and Herriges, Kling and Phaneuf
(2004) for examples of these restrictions). To complete the work Ayres and Kneese
and Krutilla, stated-preference research needs to be re-directed to measuring the nature
of these connections. Our analysis has proposed a basis for how this task might be
accomplished. The changes in virtual prices for non-market services signaled important
feedbacks in our general equilibrium model.
As we noted earlier, a key element in most CGE models is the use of a representative
agent to characterize all consumers. While it is possible to allow for more agents to re￿ect
distributional e￿ects, the degree of heterogeneity in the prices di￿erent consumers face
is minimal due to the law of one price. With non-market goods, the virtual prices facing
di￿erent groups would be di￿erent. This e￿ect could be accommodated by having di￿erent
agents, but the di￿erences would arise from their hypothesized spatial location. It is also
possible to reconsider aggregation relationships that might in￿uence the speci￿cation for a
38single representative agent’s preferences from those facing di￿erent prices (see Bergstrom
and Cornes (1981)). In either case, these changes would likely enhance concerns about
the complementarity/substitution relationships we have focused on in this analysis.
A ￿rst step in this research would be e￿orts to develop tests for the spatial and temporal
scales people perceive as the extent of the market for use and non-use related services.
Such tests could be considered in a framework that is comparable to the scope test. A
scope test asks how total willingness to pay changes with a change in the size of the
change in a non-market good or service. The analysis we propose would consider how
the marginal willingness to pay changes with modi￿cations in the availability or quantity
of related market and non-market goods and services over di￿erent spatial and temporal
scales.
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Figure 2: Relative Number of Species Supported by a Lake and Ph Levels
43Figure 3: E￿ects of Substitution on Calibrated Virtual Price Functions
44Table 1: Non-Market Components of the Acidic Deposition Model
Model Component Transformation/Adjustment Source
Emission Rates
SO2, NOx Reported in thousands of short tons per year for full
consumption; industrial processes, transportation and
(where relevant) agricultural and forestry and natu-





SO2, NOx Reported in kg/ha in Prospective Analysis; used 1990
base scenario to estimate the conversion from tons
of emissions to kg/hectare/ton; for SO2 deposition
rate is 22 kg/ha; for composite of SO2 and NOx it is
assumed to be 23 kg/ha
United States Environmental
Protection Agency (1999)




$1.33 for a 50% reduction per kg/ha in SO2 deposition
rate; based on random utility recreation model com-
puted for season for the quality improvement’s impact
on catch rates (1995 dollars)
Englin, Cameron, Mendelsohn,
Parsons and Shankle (1991) is
reported in New York State Envi-





$2.56 per household for a 5% reduction in kg/ha that
leads to improved forestry views; based on analysis
of visibility and integral vistas from acidi￿cation for
Adirondacks (1995 dollars)
New York State Environmental






Rede￿ne the increment based on Kopp and Smith
(1997) characterization of index of stock of resources:
L = total stock of lakes
l = lakes of concern
(L   l)1= = index of e￿ective lakes
Changes in l give rise to the e￿ects of the plan (1995
dollars)
WTP = $48.04 for 50.8% increment
Banzhaf et al. (2006)
45Table 2: % Changes in Equilibrium Prices and Quantities for 43% reduction in SO2 and
NOx by Level of Use-Based Complementarity
High Central Low
(rl;r = u=8) (rl;r = u=4) (rl;r = u=2)
%  P %  Q %  P %  Q %  P %  Q
Energy 24.8 -23.6 24.8 -22.7 24.8 -21.3
Services 0.8 -1.9 0.8 -1.5 0.8 -1.0
Agriculture 2.6 -3.4 2.6 -2.7 2.6 -1.6
Manufacturing 2.1 -4.8 2.1 -3.7 2.1 -2.1
Food and Alcohol 1.4 -5.4 1.4 -3.9 1.4 -1.4
Consumer Manufactures 1.7 -5.7 1.7 -4.2 1.7 -1.7
Transportation 145.2 -55.4 145.2 -54.6 145.2 -53.5
Utilities 91.7 -45.0 91.7 -44.1 91.7 -42.6
Consumer Services 0.9 14.2 0.9 12.5 0.9 9.2
Leisure 0.0 14.5 0.0 13.1 0.0 10.1
Fish Services -74.5 74.9 -52.9 73.5 -38.7 71.2
Tree Services -77.9 82.8 -55.9 80.1 -40.5 75.9
Existence/Habitat Services -17.6 82.8 -18.7 80.1 -22.9 75.9
NOTES: The di￿erent market and nonmarket activities represented in the model are described on the rows of
the table. The three horizontal sections of the table, labeled High, Central and Low describe results under the
di￿erence assumptions about the degree of complementarity between the use-based nonmarket services in the
model and leisure and market-based consumer services. For each of these scenarios, we report the percentage
change in the price (or virtual price) of the activity and the percentage change in the quantity supplied from
benchmark levels.
46Table 3: Decomposition of Willingness to Pay Measures for Improvements in Fish Services
by GE Adjustment Type
Before After % Di￿
High
WTP GE 5.6 8.9 58.7
WTP P 5.6 8.6 53.1
WTP q 5.6 5.8 2.7
WTP qi 5.6 5.6 ￿
Central
WTP GE 7.0 8.8 25.9
WTP P 7.0 8.7 25.2
WTP q 7.0 7.0 0.5
WTP qi 7.0 7.0 ￿
Low
WTP GE 7.6 8.6 12.2
WTP P 7.6 8.6 12.5
WTP q 7.6 7.6 -0.2
WTP qi 7.6 7.6 ￿
NOTES: Before: WTP for improvement in ￿sh ser-
vices before other GE adjustments have taken place
(100-millions of 1995 dollars). After: WTP for im-
provement in ￿sh services after other GE adjust-
ments indicated in the ￿rst row of the table have
taken place (100-millions of 1995 dollars). % Di￿:
Perecentage di￿erence between the Before and Af-
ter column values. The three vertical sections of
the table, labeled High, Central and Low describe
results under the di￿erence assumptions about the
degree of complementarity between the use-based
nonmarket services in the model and leisure and
market-based consumer services.
47Table 4: Elasticity Sensitivity Analysis: % Changes in Virtual Prices and Quantities of
Nonmarket Services
Elasticity Scenario Fish Tree Existence/Habitat
h r rl %  P %  Q %  P %  Q %  P %  Q
1/2 1/2 1/2 -69.3 74.5 -73.2 81.8 -35.9 81.9
1 1/2 1/2 -74.5 74.9 -77.9 82.8 -17.6 82.8
2 1/2 1/2 -82.7 75.8 -85.1 84.7 -6.7 84.6
1/2 1 1/2 -41.1 74.6 -44.7 82.1 -33.6 82.2
1 1 1/2 -47.0 75.1 -50.5 83.0 -16.2 83.1
2 1 1/2 -57.3 75.8 -60.3 84.7 -5.9 84.6
1/2 2 1/2 -21.9 74.6 -24.3 82.0 -32.5 82.1
1 2 1/2 -26.2 75.0 -28.6 82.8 -15.5 82.9
2 2 1/2 -34.3 75.7 -36.5 84.4 -5.5 84.3
1/2 1/2 1 -75.0 73.2 -78.1 79.4 -39.3 79.5
1 1/2 1 -79.4 73.6 -82.0 80.1 -19.8 80.1
2 1/2 1 -86.2 74.2 -88.1 81.5 -7.9 81.4
1/2 1 1 -47.6 73.2 -50.8 79.4 -37.5 79.4
1 1 1 -52.9 73.5 -55.9 80.1 -18.7 80.1
2 1 1 -62.2 74.2 -64.8 81.3 -7.3 81.3
1/2 2 1 -26.6 73.1 -28.8 79.1 -36.5 79.2
1 2 1 -30.7 73.4 -32.8 79.8 -18.0 79.8
2 2 1 -38.3 73.9 -40.4 80.9 -6.9 80.9
1/2 1/2 2 -82.8 71.5 -84.8 76.3 -45.0 76.3
1 1/2 2 -86.1 71.7 -87.7 76.7 -23.8 76.7
2 1/2 2 -91.0 72.1 -92.1 77.5 -10.3 77.4
1/2 1 2 -58.2 71.3 -60.6 75.9 -44.3 75.9
1 1 2 -62.5 71.5 -64.8 76.3 -23.3 76.3
2 1 2 -70.1 71.9 -72.0 77.1 -10.0 77.1
1/2 2 2 -35.1 71.1 -36.9 75.5 -43.8 75.5
1 2 2 -38.7 71.3 -40.5 75.9 -22.9 75.9
2 2 2 -45.5 71.7 -47.2 76.7 -9.7 76.6
NOTES: The ￿rst three columns of the table indicate the value that each of the substitution
elasticity parameters takes on in each scenario relative to the value assumed in the central cases.
The three horizontal sections of the table, labeled Fish, Tree and Existence/Habitat refer to the
three nonmarket services in the model. For each nonmarket service, we report the percentage
change in the virtual price and quantity supplied from benchmark levels.
48A Elements of the Numerical Model
Table 5 lists the dimensions of the economic model. The model describes a general
equilibrium in sectors of the economy and primary factors.














Benchmark data on quantities, prices, and elasticities provide the calibration point for
the production and utility functions that describe the economy.
Key assumptions and notation:
 The model is identical to that used in Goulder and Williams [2003] except in the form
of the utility function and the absence of a pre-existing labor income tax. Whenever
possible we maintain the same calibration as Goulder and Williams [2003].
 All goods are produced via constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production func-
tions. This implies constant returns to scale technology in all sectors.
 The representative agent’s welfare is produced through the consumption of consumer
goods, leisure, and environmental amenities, subject to time endowment and income
constraints. The utility function is a nested CES function.
49Table 6: Intermediate Production Benchmark Values
energy services agriculture manufactures
energy 253,800.3 35,748.4 12,135.2 83,751.8
services 55,608.3 1,182,177.2 48,378.1 753,981.8
agriculture 174.6 109,776.9 353,617.4 32,591.6
manufactures 108,723.6 537,487.8 58,516.9 2,017,510.8
labor 79,221.2 2,239,303.1 55,472.4 1,143,765.5
total 497,528.0 4,104,493.4 528,120.0 4,031,601.6
source ￿ Reproduced from Table B2 in Goulder and Williams [2003].
note ￿ All ￿gures in millions of US 1995 $.
Table 7: Final Consumption Production Benchmark Values
food consumer consumer transportation utilities
& alcohol services manufactures
energy 297.6 34.6 5,571.4 50,320.6 55,868.1
services 480,375.7 835,116.3 571,872.7 92,237.5 84,745.9
agriculture 24,721.9 105.5 7,131.1 0.5 0.5
manufactures 315,431.3 75,867.5 917,510.0 0.5 553.2
total 820,826.4 911,123.9 1,502,085.1 142,559.1 141,167.7
source ￿ Reproduced from Table B3 in Goulder and Williams [2003].
note ￿ All ￿gures in millions of US 1995 $.
50Table 8: Model Notation and Parameter Values
Sets
C Final Consumption Goods {fda,csv,cmn,trn,utl}
I Intermediate Goods {ene, svc, agr, mnf}
Parameters
T Aggregate time endowment  lab = 0:05, 
h
lab = 0:25
j Substitution between inputs in intermediate and ￿nal sectors  ene = 0:9
u Substitution between leisure-nonmarket bundle and market goods  lab = 0:05, 
h
lab = 0:25
C Substitution between consumer goods in consumption nest 0.85
h Substitution between existence/habitat service and all other consumption = 1
2u;u;2u








 reads ￿calibrated to imply￿.
lab and 
h
lab denote the uncompensated and compensated labor supply elasticities, respectively.
ene denotes the own-price demand elasticity of energy.
51B Production Structures
Figure 4: Intermediate Goods
Output (Ii) Air Quality (a)
Leontief
Labor (T   l)
CES (I)
ene svc  mnf
Intermediate inputs (Iji)
Figure 5: Final Goods
Output (Ci) Air Quality (a)
Leontief
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Intermediate inputs (Iji)
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